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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

HAS CONGRESS ABDICATED ITS LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY TO
ITS STAFF?

DENNIS J. TUCHLER*
The submissions to this program examine the current status of Madison’s
plan for the preservation of republican government against the forces of faction
and the threat of tyranny.1 To assure the preservation of liberty, the executive,
legislative, and judicial powers were distributed in a way that kept power from
dangerous concentration in the hands of one branch.2 To assure that law is
made “with the consent of the governed,”3 and the activity of legislation was
conducted “consonant to the public good,”4 free from domination by faction,
the legislative power was conferred on a representative assembly, the Congress
of the United States. The constituency of each member of this congress is so
populous that the influence of faction is drowned in the numbers of voters who
select each member of Congress. Even if some faction took control in one or
more constituencies, that faction would be made ineffective by the large
number of elected members in either house of Congress.5 If legislative power
accrues to the executive branch, protection against tyranny provided by the
separation of powers is weakened. If legislative power is exercised by other
than persons elected by the people of the United States, the legitimacy
conferred on legislation by its having been consented to by the people’s
representatives in Congress, is called into question. The focus in this program
has been on the first concern — the separation of powers. This paper raises the
second question, whether law making today is truly “with the consent of the
governed”6 when much of the legislative activity leading up to the official act
of a member of Congress with respect to that legislation, is carried out
primarily by the legislative staff. Has Congress abdicated substantial
legislative authority to its own staff? If it has ceded power to the staff by
reliance on it for information and the execution of primary legislative

* Professor of Law, St. Louis University School of Law.
1. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison).
2. Id.
3. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
4. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).
5. Id.
6. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
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functions,7 it has done so in part in defense of the separation of powers.
Without such staff, Congress would depend even more than it does on the
Executive branch (and on lobbyists representing private interests) for most of
its information, and the initiation of a substantial part of Congress’s legislative
solutions for current problems of the Union.
As has been noted in other contributions to this program, abdication of
legislative function differs from delegation of function to another branch of
government. The latter is made, at least in theory, by design, which includes
the possibility that it can be regulated or reversed by later legislative action.
Abdication of legislative authority is inadvertent, compelled by the
circumstances of legislation and the multiplicity of problems taken up by the
federal government for treatment, if not cure. Abdication of legislative
function to unelected participants in the legislative process, is in furtherance of
the legislative function. If Congress did not need it, the conferral of power
over the legislative product upon staff would not have been made.
In terms of the quality of the legislative product, the conferral, whether by
design or abdication, may not be a bad thing. Indeed, this arrangement of
legislative function might enhance the degree to which law making responds to
national needs. If the legislative result is of good quality, why does it matter
that much of the process of finding and formulating issues and fashioning the
legislative response to them is in the hands of unelected but intelligent and
talented staff members who are, after all, under the supervisory control of a
member of Congress? Still, if legislation is to retain its democratic cachet,
there must be a line beyond which delegation cannot go. That is, there may be
non-delegable legislative functions — functions that must be exercised by
legislators authorized to legislate under Article I if legislative product is truly
consented to by the governed. If there are such functions, what are they? If
they are not properly delegable and not properly exercised by other than an
elected member of Congress, to what extent can the exercise of these functions
be aided by persons other than the one who is to perform them?8
The working life of a Senator or Representative in the Congress of the
United States is taken up primarily with three kinds of activities. They provide
services to constituents, mainly by aiding these constituents in their struggles

7. By “primary legislative functions” I mean all those steps from gathering information and
formulating issues to the drafting of legislative proposals and the decision as to how to proceed
with respect to proposed legislation.
8. The question raised in this paper is different from the question of delegability of duties
by agents, or the related question of whether a lawyer delegates so much responsibility in a matter
to a person who is not a member of the relevant bar as to be chargeable with aiding in the
unauthorized practice of law. The issue is not one of liability to a principal or prevention of harm
to a client from inexpert or disloyal activities by subagents. Raised in this paper is the legitimacy
of a demand on the people of the United States that they act in conformity with statutes enacted
by the federal government.
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with the federal government and providing information about pending
legislation. They engage in legislative and oversight activity. They gather
money and support for the coming election and spend time in the home district
mending political fences and reinforcing political support. The time spent on
legislative and oversight activity is notoriously insufficient to assure even
formal service to the image of a representative fully engaged in oversight of
the government and the fashioning and enactment of legislation. Most of the
legislative activity in either house of Congress is done in committee and
subcommittee. The membership of these committees does not reflect the
distribution of interests and political positions in the house as a whole, and the
products of these committees are rarely considered in depth, if at all, by all
members much less by nonmembers of the committees or their staffs.9 The
more a member of Congress participates in committee work, the greater is that
member’s potential influence on legislation. On the other hand, the more
committees on which the member serves, the less potential impact that member
has on any one committee’s work. The degree to which committee work takes
the time of each member of Congress is strictly up to that member. Senators
are members of three committees and several subcommittees. In the House of
Representatives, some members serve on only one committee and no
subcommittees,10 while others join many more.11 Plainly, then, the picture of
legislation as the result of collegial effort and consent by the representatives of
all the nation assembled in Congress is false. The legitimacy of representative
institutions in a democracy depends on the representative institutions’
somehow “standing for” the people represented. But, even if the membership
of Congress were the mirror of the nation, the committees are not mirrors of
Congress in terms of ideology or the distribution of regional concerns. Finally,
the votes of members of Congress in committee and on the floor of each house
are not fully informed and often not informed at all except with respect to the
broad outlines of the laws they are consenting to by their votes.12 But, even if
it were otherwise — even if each committee represented well the house it
serves, and even if each committee’s product was the result of the efforts of all

9. For a discussion of the scope and depth of participation by members of Congress, see
RICHARD L. HALL, PARTICIPATION IN CONGRESS (1996).
10. Representative William Clay is one such member, available at http://www.house.gov/
clay/bio.htm (last visited August 31, 2000).
11. Mary Bono, for example, serves on three committees and five subcommittees. She is
also chair of the Congressional Salton Sea Task Force and co-chair of the Entertainment Task
Force and Travel and Tourism Task Force, available at http://www.house.gov/bono/bio.htm (last
visited August 31, 2000).
12. See, e.g., HALL, supra note 9, at 32. Because of the immense amount of information
needed to think intelligently about all the matters before Congress, many members of Congress
become “specialists” by limiting their efforts to particular areas of national concern — normally
areas that are of concern to their constituencies. Id.
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its members, it is not at all clear that the members know very much about the
legislation they are producing, most of the time. The knowledge they have and
the decisions they make with respect to legislation is the result of work by
others, primarily staff members.
For each member of Congress and for each committee and subcommittee
of either house of Congress there are employed a substantial number of staff,
who manage the day-to-day legislative work of the members and committees,
and care for the members political needs, with respect to both their
constituencies and their status in the house in which they serve.13 The relative
importance of legislative and political concerns vary with the member of
Congress. The function of the staff is, among other things, to enable the
member of Congress to obtain and react to information about matters that
concern that member. This reduces dependence for such information and for
legislative ideas on the Executive branch of the government and interest
groups. As access to information increases, so does the amount of information
obtained and the need for help in managing that information and reacting to it
in terms of legislation.14 “The members [of Congress] cannot begin to control
the workload their staffs collectively help to generate. Yet Congress could not
function in today’s world without the staff on which it has come to depend.”15
The staff arranges hearings, drafts bills and engages in negotiation with respect
to at least the initial form of legislative proposals. Indeed, the staff affects
every step in the legislative process. They can run committee investigations,
the results of which they can leak to the media thereby influencing what
members of Congress decide is important enough for a legislative response.
According to a respected observer of Congress,
Once a bill is on the agenda, the staff works to assemble a coalition behind it,
arranging detailed amendments with other staff members and with interest
group representatives to broaden support for the bill without sacrificing the
goals the [relevant committee] chairman, often at their urging, has adopted.
When conflicts cannot be resolved, the member may then learn enough about
the details to weigh the political costs of compromise. But even then, the role
of the member is clearly limited. As former Senator Dick Clark (D-Iowa) once
13. In 1999, there were 9,636 staff personnel in the House of Representatives, 6,391 in the
Senate, and 104 serving joint committees. There are also staff in support agencies: General
Accounting Office (3,275), Congressional Research Service (747), and Congressional Budget
Office (232). NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, ET AL., AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC
POLICY RESEARCH, VITAL STATISTICS ON CONGRESS 1999 – 2000, at 129-32 tbl. 5-1
(Congressional Quarterly, Inc.1999). See also id. at 132 figure 5-1 (indicating the dramatic
change in number of staff since 1890, especially after 1970).
14. “Without its staff, Congress would quickly become the prisoner of outside sources of
information in the executive branch and interest groups.” MICHAEL J. MALBIN, UNELECTED
REPRESENTATIVES, CONGRESSIONAL STAFF AND THE FUTURE OF REPRESENTATIVE
GOVERNMENT 5 (1980).
15. Id. at 4.
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said, “there is no question about our enormous dependency and their influence.
In all legislation, they’re the ones that lay out the options”.16

In all cases, the staff usually sees itself as furthering the policy objectives of
the members they serve.17
Speaking of a matter before a Senate committee, Malbin notes:
Only a few senators seemed to follow or care about the details of the bill, but
they all seemed to know exactly how it might affect them politically . . . What
the senators did not seem to know or care about, however, were the different
substantive options the staff was considering when differences in substance
had no political impact.18

The functioning unit of Congress is the “enterprise” rather than the elected
member of Congress.19 The enterprise consists of the staff at the member’s
disposal, with the member playing the role of chief executive. The member is
the source of ideological bias for the staff’s work. The staff does the work of
selecting issues, and fashioning legislative responses to those issues. The
member whom the staff serves may play a decisive role at any stage of the
process of developing legislation or a position with respect to legislation, or

16. Id. at 4-5 (footnote omitted).
17. The staff of a committee normally views itself as serving the Chairman of that
committee. There are some differences between staff that view themselves as “professional” and
those that consider their mission more “political.” The former see their function as laying out
alternative options, leaving decision to the committee. According to Malbin, the more political
seem more useful.
Our examination of nonpartisan staffs has uncovered a crucial distinction between
professional staffs that confine themselves to laying out options or suggesting possible
compromises and equally professional staffs that do independent policy analysis and, in
some instances, make recommendations. The former have an easier time maintaining
their nonpartisan credibility but, however useful they may be, they seem to be unable to
serve Congress’s needs.
Id. at 204.
18. Id. at 74. As to another legislative matter, involving conflict between a bill passed in the
Senate and one passed in the House, dealing with the same subject, Malbin noted:
Key staff people simply sat down for three days . . . and resolved the differences between
the two bills. These differences went well beyond monetary questions to ones of policy,
that the committee members saw as issues of principle. As a result, the staff level
compromise was no simple split-the-difference affair. To find some common ground
between the interests of the key members of the House and Senate, the staffs had to come
up with imaginative new formulations significantly changing existing law. These
formulations, some of which had never been discussed previously in either chamber, were
ratified by key committee members and adopted unanimously, with virtually no
debate . . .
Id. at 76. Richard L. Hall observed that legislative assistants attend subcommittee meetings for
their bosses, and do the preparation work for most meetings. HALL, supra note 9, at 89.
19. See DAVID WHITEMAN, COMMUNICATION IN CONGRESS, MEMBERS, STAFF AND THE
SEARCH FOR INFORMATION 3-6 (1995).
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she may play merely a final, ratifying role with respect to legislation on which
that member votes.20
To the extent that the member of Congress serves as an agent of her
constituency, the staff is quite helpful. It gathers information from the
constituency and provides for the appropriate response. There is little
discretion to be exercised here, except insofar as it relates to ignoring requests
for help or refusing to provide particular help to the complaining constituent. I
doubt that there is any fear that the staff usurps the legislator’s function in this
respect. Similarly, the role of staff in the search for campaign funding raises
no signals warning of usurpation of essential functions. The question as to
whether the staff usurps legislative function goes to the legislative and
oversight functions. The only official act of a member of Congress is to vote,
either in committee or on the floor. That function has not been delegated to
staff. But a vote comes at the end of a process of legislating in which the
member can be, but often is not involved directly. Such involvement as there is
often occurs through the agency of staff, which gathers information, digests it
and presents it to the member, and provides guidance with respect to the
legislator’s next move. The result is a decision by the elected member of
Congress based mainly on a large number of previous decisions as to what is

20. MALBIN, supra note 14, at 28-36. According to Professor Hall:
[I]t is not so much the member per se, but the member’s enterprise that acts in the
legislative deliberations of Congress. Salisbury and Shepsle . . . correctly emphasize that
in the contemporary Congress, members are akin to leaders of organized enterprises,
which include not only the principal or CEO but numerous staff members who serve as
their agents. Indeed, it is often one of the member’s legislative assistants or the legislative
director, not the member herself, who screens issues, alerts her to various legislative
opportunities, briefs her on the ‘upside’ opportunities and the ‘downside’ risks, and
otherwise helps determine the priorities of the office. Information the staff provide to
their boss thus becomes an important basis for her perceptions of particular bills. The
boss’s reactions to staffers’ recommendations, in turn, form the basis of staff perceptions
of how the boss perceives her interests.
None of this is to say that members are somehow ciphers, as institutional critics
sometimes charge. On the contrary, the agent’s impulse to learn and then faithfully
represent her principal’s interests is exceedingly strong in the legislative context. Perhaps
the first and most important job of the new legislative assistant is to absorb as much
information as possible about the member’s district and the member’s policy interests. To
unwittingly recommend some action that the boss recognizes as politically dangerous, for
instance, is the surest way to lose credibility within the enterprise. To act in a way that
ultimately causes electoral harm, legislative embarrassment, or a violation of the
representative’s policy interests is the surest way to lose one’s job. In an attempt to
anticipate and correctly represent their boss’s interests, legislative staffers employ a
number of information sources, including past speeches and statements; consultations
with the legislative director, administrative assistant, or other staffers; and of course
consultations with the member herself.
HALL, supra note 9, at 77-78.
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important and relevant to the member’s needs,21 the members own policy
preferences, and the member’s calculation of the political costs and benefits of
the decision.
At what point does the work of the staff defeat the ideal of government
with the consent of the governed, and become government primarily by
unelected bureaucrats? This question is properly posed with respect to those
making decisions in all three branches of the government. The courts have
their law clerks, and the executive agencies have a thick layer of staff between
the beginning and the end of administrative decision making, engaged in
sorting and analyzing data and making preliminary decisions as to the shape
and content of executive decisions. The question of abdication of function is
dealt with here only with respect to legislation in Congress to the way in which
legislation is consented to by the governed. What counts as that consent,
which may be given only by the governed or their representatives? If that
function is exhausted by a somewhat informed vote, then there is no difficulty
at all with any assumption of the pre-vote processing of legislation by
unelected staff. The resulting legislation has the required pedigree and its
democratic cachet is preserved in its quality. But what if the vote is taken after
much of the process of decision making that led to this vote was in the hands
of the staff, which is responsible to, and responsive to, but not guided by the
member whose vote is required? Moreover, what if this predominance of staff
influence is the result, not of failure on the part of the member to do her job
properly, but rather of the normal process of legislating for the Nation. It is not
that the member will not, but rather that the member cannot do more.
In a way, assigning the preliminary work of legislation to the staff serves
Madison’s goal of eliminating faction and assuring a focus on the needs of the
Union and its people. The personal and committee staffs in both houses are
made up of people, most of whom live in and expect to make their fortunes in
the Washington, DC area. They look forward to working in various capacities
in both the Executive and Legislative branches, or as lobbyists based in the
District of Columbia, dealing with friends and former associates serving
Congress or the executive branch. Their outlook is partisan22 and national

21. There is an important distinction between two kinds of staff — that staff that pursues the
ends of the member to whom their loyalty is due, and that staff which treats its task as simply
working out the policy implications of various alternative approaches to particular issues, and
presenting those alternatives in all their fullness. The former will present a product that is biased
according to the assumed wishes of the member for whom the job is done. That will include only
those alternatives that the member is likely to accept with recommendations as to which
alternative is the best. The latter will present a product that is biased by the staff’s own view of
what is workable and appropriate, and includes no explicit recommendations of the best of the
many alternatives presented. Both kinds of staff are discussed in MALBIN, supra note 14.
22. The staff is partisan in both senses — adherence to a political party and personal loyalty
to the member whom the staff serves.
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rather than local unless their role on the staff is to take note of and respond (or
recommend a response) to matters of importance in a member’s constituency.
On the other hand, the disconnection between staff and the member’s
constituency must reduce the degree to which the preliminary decisions made
by staff with respect to issues to be raised and the shape of legislation to be
proposed or voted dilute the degree to which the enterprise made up of staff
and member actually represents the constituency insofar as that constituency is
different from other parts of the United States.
What, at minimum, is expected of a member of Congress by either those
who vote in the member’s constituency or by those who observe Congress in
terms of its function in a democratic republic? If either minimum expectation
is not met, then the adoption or rejection of legislation is not properly the
“consent of the governed.” Is more than the bare vote expected? Is it enough
that a reasonably informed member be told enough about a legislative proposal
to support a decision for or against it? Or must more than the final choice with
respect to legislation be made by elected members, and with more than a
passing understanding of what it is that the vote is about?
A representative is sent by a constituency to engage in the process of
legislation in the name of the constituents. Whether the representative
represents all the constituency or only those who voted for that agent is
irrelevant to this inquiry. Is this agent sent to deal only with matters of direct
concern to the constituency, or to the economic or other interests of the people
who sent the member to Washington? Madison envisaged Congress as the
People in microcosm, freed of the influence of faction. The people of the
United States met by proxy on matters of national importance.23 On such a
view, a member’s function was not limited to those matters in of direct concern
to the member’s constituents. It extended to consenting to all legislation not
directly affecting his constituency — even legislation opposed by members
representing a constituency that would be affected directly by it, so long as the
legislator judged it desirable and “consonant to the public good.”24 On such a
view the duties of a member must include being sufficiently informed to aid in
the deliberations25 and cast a thoughtful vote with respect to all legislation
before the house. This vote to change (or not to change) the law, cast after
deliberation and debate in which those opposed are heard by all who vote, is
23. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison) (stating that legislators are similar to
judges with respect to issues before them, comparing legislation to adjudication); THE
FEDERALIST NO. 39 (James Madison) (It is essential that the members be derived from and
elected directly or indirectly by the people.). There were 65 members of the first House of
Representatives and 26 Senators. See U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2 - 3. That is, both houses were
small enough for one to imagine general thoughtful discussion of issues before them.
24. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).
25. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION 78-79 (2000) (noting that deliberation is an end in itself).
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the desired consent of the governed. Can such consent be given by the
participants in the federal legislative process?
However normatively attractive the vision of legislation in the preceding
paragraph is, is it empirically accurate? If it is not, does that mean that the
project of representative democracy has failed to provide a government whose
powers are exercised by or with the consent of the governed? There is another
view of the political process which sees legislation in terms of economics. If
this approach is empirically accurate, does it leave us with the picture of a
government which exercises its just powers with the consent of the governed?
What if a representative were most accurately seen as representing the
economic interests (at least the dominant interests) in the constituency
represented? Legislation would then be best understood as the result of
bargains struck in behalf of interest groups by the people’s representatives.
That is, rather than avoiding the influence of factions, the legislative process
may be entirely a matter of adjusting the competing claims of factions.26 If this
view is sound, then consent is given to the outcome of bargains, and all the
consenting legislators need know is the actual effect of the proposed legislation
on the various interest groups involved. It should not matter how the
information is obtained, so long as it is reasonably accurate. Staff work, on
this view, enhances the ability of members of Congress to develop legislation
and cast their votes, so long as the member is reasonably certain that the
information received from the staff is accurate and the groundwork provided
by staff through drafting and negotiation is suitable to the bargain sought.
Indeed, the most valuable information and work should come, not from staff,
but from the representatives of organized interest groups. On the assumption
that all relevant interests are represented in the bargaining process and the
bargaining is fair, one can say that any legislative outcome is consented to by
(in the name of) the governed, all of whom are parties by proxy to those
bargains in which they are concerned.
The strong version of neither of these two views of the legislative process
can give us an adequate picture of modern legislation. A weaker version of
either, purporting to cover “most” rather than “all” of the legislative process is
easier to accept but leaves us at sea as to the adequacy of the member’s
participation in that process to give the legislative product the seal of
democratic approval.27 Under either approach, there remains unanswered the
question, when is representation adequate? Is it adequate when the elected
member depends on staff, chosen without the participation of the member’s
constituents, for ideas as to goals to achieve, the formulation of legislative

26. Legislation as the outcome of interest group conflict is treated in ESKRIDGE, supra note
25, at 81-97.
27. See DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE, A CRITICAL
INTRODUCTION (1991) (discussing competing views of the political process).
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solutions to promote, and information sufficient to enable the member of
Congress to function intelligently with respect to the legislative material before
him. If it is not, it is because it cannot be, given the scope and amount of work
taken up by the federal government. Put slightly differently, it had better be
adequate because there is no going back to the days in which members of
congress were substantially in control of the fashioning of legislation.
CONCLUSION
In order to maintain its independence of the Executive Branch, and
representatives of particular interests, Congress has come to depend on staff,
hired by each house of Congress to serve the legislative needs of individual
legislators and committees. Commentators have noted that the work done by
staff affects whether and how issues are addressed to an increasing degree.
Indeed, it is not unreasonable to assume that most matters before the Congress
are better understood in terms of their content and supporting data by staff than
by the members whom the staff serve and whose vote is necessary to the
adoption or rejection of legislative proposals. The question arises whether the
actual participation of the elected member in the legislative process is adequate
in terms of the requirement of a representative democracy that government be
with the consent of the governed. Is the bare act of voting enough—is it
enough that a majority of members voting on a particular measure has voted to
adopt or to reject it? Or must that vote be cast only after debate which is
meaningful in terms of the final shape of the legislative proposal and informed
by the informed arguments of those who support and those who oppose the
proposal? The latter is the vision of Madison and those who love democracy
but accept representative government as a reasonable (because necessary)
second best option. That vision is not in no way correct unless one views the
vote as having been cast by an enterprise, itself fulfilling the function of
representation because it is led, but not controlled, by an elected member of
Congress.

